

THE
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THE RELATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND
PHILOLOGY.¹

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Professor Wundt in his *Völkerpsychologie* has accomplished a third of the program which is marked out in his discussion of this discipline, in the fourth volume of the *Studien*, and second part of the second volume of the *Logik*.

Wundt presupposes a *Volksseele*, whose reality is assured in the same fashion as that in which we assure ourselves of the reality of the individual mind. In a word, we find phenomena of experience whose relations and organization depend not upon individual mind but upon the social constructs given in the environment of the community to which we belong. "The mental products which arise through the common life of the members of a community, are not less elements of reality than the psychical processes within a single consciousness. They are of course nothing that could occur outside of individual mind. But as it is not the psychical elements in their isolated condition but their combinations and the products that spring from them which we call an individual mind, so the *Volksseele*, in empirical sense, does not consist of a bare sum of the units of individual experience, whose contents make up its content. In the case of the *Volksseele* as well, there result from the union of these units peculiar psychical and psycho-physical processes, which either could not arise at all in the consciousness of an individual

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or at least not in the completeness with which they develop through the interaction of individuals."¹ The implication of this is not that the *Volksseele* is a construction which arises as a result of scientific investigation and generalization, but that it has the same sort of existence in our thought as the individual mind, in so far as we think the peculiar processes for the presentation of which such a concept is necessary.

There are two characteristics of language, myth, and custom which distinguished them as a psychological field from the phenomena of individual consciousness. These are their independence of the life period of the individual, and the evolution which characterizes them and which extends as a process through generations. In so far then as we speak of language as developing from generation to generation, and still conceive of it as an expression of native impulse, gradually built up by assimilations, and complications, and fusions, and associations, and controlled by apperceptive processes, in other words describe it as a psychological phenomenon, we are recognizing what Wundt insists upon. We are postulating an empirical community-mind within which such processes take place whose boundaries are not those of the individuals who make up the group, but those of the community.

The point of view which Wundt criticizes, and which has been the customary one of the philologist whose psychology has been of the Herbartian School, looks upon language in so far as it is phenomenon of community-life as belonging to the domain of the historical and objective comparative sciences. Psychology has jurisdiction only in so far as speech is regarded as the act of the individual *qua* individual. A comparative physiology which explained and defined language-changes as sounds, and a comparative grammar which presented these changes and explained them as forms of speech, would be the sciences of language. Psychology would be an applied science which would give extensive assistance both from the point of view of sound — physiological psychology — and from the point of view of forms — the explanation of changes of meaning, of inflections, etc. But the changes which an individual psychology could

¹ *Völkerpsy.*, Vol. I., pp. 9 and 10.

give would be confined to the consciousness of the individual. The explanations would account only for the change as an experience of the individual. In so far as this experience becomes a fact of physical science as sound, or of philological science as speech, it would be subject to universal laws transcending the existence of the individual. In this sense language would not belong to the field of psychology, but psychology would be brought in to account for particular forms and incidental changes, while the laws of language would be those that followed the uniformities of change in words and speech viewed as the subjects of an objective science. In a similar manner one could present a psychological picture of the occurrence of a crime, while a statistical science would simply deal with it as an objective fact, or a sociological inquiry would deal with the general conditions under which it took place, perhaps making use of the psychological treatment for clues and comprehension, but translating all into terms of the objective science before the subject matter was in form for the treatment of sociology. But the best illustration is from history. Psychological interpretation is an essential part of an historical presentation, but history aims to identify and present the reality of an event or series of events. They are presented as events, not as psychological laws. Psychological laws come in to aid in the full understanding of the event, but not as the subject matter which history presents. From these events various laws may conceivably be generalized, but these laws would not be psychological laws. From such a point of view it has been the custom, and to a large degree remains the custom, to regard language. It is an objective fact like the events of history, and the laws of language are objective laws in the same sense that the generalizations of history are conceived of as objective laws. A consistent Herbartian, such as the philologist Paul, recognizes no psychological phenomenon which is not one of an individual soul. Language is not an affair of the individual soul, and its laws are frequently generalizations which would not have the slightest meaning if read into terms of the experience of the individual soul. The mechanism of the individual soul may be that which is responsible for the changes and the growth and

development of language, but the product lies outside of the experience of the souls whose mechanisms are responsible for it.

The same questions arise with reference to myth and custom. Myth represents the ideas of a people or group of peoples, when these ideas are the expression of the impulses of the community and when they are the carriers of the emotional content of the community life. Custom (*Sitte*) is community-direction of conduct, the impulse under the control of tradition and public opinion. Out of the first spring religion and art and out of the other arise the institutions of law and government. As contents of idea and emotion and voluntary control they are subject matter for psychology. But the contents they represent far transcend the limits of the individual experience. Indeed they are so vast and overwhelming in their force and mass that they receive the individual only as the ocean receives the drop of water, though the ocean is nothing but drops of water.

Lazarus and Steinthal in the opening pages of the *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, though Herbartians, abandoned the consistent position of Paul and maintained that psychology deals not with the *Seele* but with the *Geist*; that while the *Seele* is a metaphysical entity the *Geist* is only the actual presentation of experience, and may be considered apart from a metaphysical doctrine of the soul. Such a presentation, as we have already seen, makes the basis for the empirical self and makes as possible a social self—the *Volksseele*. But while their position in this regard is identical with that of Wundt, their program of a Folkpsychology is radically different. If they abandoned an Herbartian *Seele* they did not give up the Herbartian *Vorstellungsmechanik*. This mechanism allows only for the play of ideas, acting and reacting upon each other, exactly as physics conceives of its elements interacting among themselves. In either of these systems there is no place for a change of content in the elements themselves. The ultimate objects remain the same, and in so far as psychology deals with these and reduces all mental processes and contents to these ideas and their interplay there can be no such thing as a development revealed by psychological analysis. For an evolution Herbartianism has no account, except in so far as this

arises through the interaction of the environment and the masses of ideas. It must be something external to the ideas themselves. In particular such an evolution as language cannot exist as a psychological datum. In the same manner we may say that a physics that dealt only with molecules would necessarily reduce the structures which arise in an evolutionary process back to these molecules. For such a physics evolution would not exist. Its business would be to analyze all objects, which might be presented to it, into elements which have presumably remained unchanged through the whole process of so-called development.

It is evident that in so far as Lazarus and Steinthal are consistent in the application of their doctrine, they could never present such growths as language, myth, and custom as psychological contents, but would be confined in their psychological treatment of them to analyzing out the psychological elements and determining the psychological laws which had contributed to their appearance. Wundt, on the other hand, recognizing that the changes which take place in subjective experience are qualitative, that no one state can ever be reduced to antecedent elements, is in a position to recognize development as a psychological phenomenon and therefore may conceivably present language in all its changes as a psychological datum.

The differences between the Herbartian treatment of a language and Wundt's is, however, not confined to the nature of the subject-matter itself. The distinction is that with which we are familiar under the terms intellectualistic and voluntaristic. It is the advantage of this latter type of psychology that it is able to start with an act in the form of an impulse. The striking illustration of this advantage is to be found in the theories of the origin of language. From the standpoint of an associational psychology — one that recognizes only ideas and their connections, or at least depends upon these for the psychological analysis of the contents of consciousness — language is almost unavoidably conceived of as an invention. While the more modern psychologist would not be guilty of the absurd theories of the origin of language, of religion, or of government which belong to the rationalism of the eighteenth century, a thorough-

going associational psychology, whether Herbartian or English, can give no account of language processes which in principle differs from these. For typical associations lie between contents of consciousness which have been analyzed out of objects and have become symbolic. The sensuous content and its meaning have been separated from each other and in so far the content is arbitrary. Our theories of association are perhaps more readily illustrated by a Volapük than by a natural language. Wundt, on the other hand, is able to refer the beginning of language to the primitive impulse to expression. The sound is at first but a gesture (*Lautgeberde*). Articulation, as a muscular process, is explained in the same way that movements of the face, of the hands, of the whole body are accounted for under the influence of emotional tension. Instead, therefore, of having to assume unknown or exceptional conditions as the antecedents of the origin of speech, we can find the conditions present in our own movements, in the first activities of children, in the gesture languages of primitive peoples or the deaf-mutes.

The advantage of this point of view is further evident in the recognition that the elements with which psychology deals are not objects — psychological atoms — but events. Among these events can be placed states which are predominantly affective, or motor in their character, and the intellectual content recognized as a development. As an illustration of the advantage of the voluntaristic attitude, Wundt's discussion of what the psychical processes are out of which the external activities in gesture language arise, and of the relation between the universal psychological laws and the individual motives that influence the expression, may be profitably presented. "The foundation on which the answer to the question must be built, and from which the psychological analysis must start, is the origin of all signs in natural gesture-language, in movements of expression. This fundamental law leads necessarily to the assumption that the primary cause of a natural gesture is not the motive of conveying an idea, but is that of the expression of an emotional activity. The gesture is first of all and originally an affective expression. However necessary it is for a language of gesture that it should raise itself above this stage, it remains true that it

would never have arisen without the original emotional impulse. Only secondarily, in so far as every affective state contains ideas charged with emotion, does the gesture become an expression of an idea. In the further psychical effects which are connected with this subsidiary phase of the expression of emotion lies the cause for the entire further development into a gesture language. It is, above all, as conveyor of ideas that the expressive movement of one calls out the like affective states in others, because only through the passage of consonant ideas from the one to the other can the actual agreement of their emotions take place. Expressions of feeling are able to give and recreate only the like fundamental direction of emotional change. The affective state itself as well as its reappearance in others gains a definite content only through the content of ideas and the movements in which these announce themselves to the outer world. Another effect of the expression of ideas goes hand in hand with the more exact reproduction of the affective state. In so far as this has given a further substratum to the reproduction of the emotional experience that has arisen in another, it arouses further ideas, that are related to those conveyed through the gestures, reinforce them, or, on the other hand, if they arouse contradictory emotions, enter into opposition to them. At this point the gesture of the other is not a mere reflex of the movement of the first; on the contrary, out of the sympathetic movement has grown an *answering* movement. If at first the boundaries between these flow into each other, gradually they must distinguish themselves more and more as the movement of ideas in individual consciousness becomes more active. If the answer was at first little more than a reproduction of the same ideal content, in the further course the reproduction of that which is perceived retreats behind the newly aroused ideas. In this fashion finally the individual emotional state, under the influence of the backward and forward interchange of gestures, has passed into a common affective experience. As, through this pronounced emphasis on the contents of ideas, the affective elements and thus the emotions themselves are moderated, the common emotional experience with the backward and forward interchange of gestures passes

into a common thought process, taking place through the exchange of gesture expression."¹

Such a conception of the beginning of gesture language passes over easily to that of the beginning of spoken language, through the recognition that articulate sounds are in their beginning but sound-gestures and take the same place in the act of emotional expression that is taken by the gesture. Perhaps there is no better illustration of the importance of psychology to the comprehension of language than such a natural and simple presentation of the beginning of the interchange of ideas through the simple sympathetic interaction of gesture expression within a common emotional situation. There could be no better illustration of the advantage of beginning one's psychological analysis with the act in its primitive form of the impulse, instead of being forced to build it up out of intellectual elements.

The illustration is also of importance in throwing light on the difference of attitude of Wundt and Delbrück. Delbrück has published under the title of *Grundfragen der Sprachforschung*, a criticism of Wundt's two-volume work. The criticism is on the whole sympathetic. When an eminent philologist treats with so much consideration a psychologist who has written a considerable treatise on the philologist's own subject from the psychologist's point of view, it is evident that to some degree it must be true that language is the field of psychology. But in just this point Delbrück is not in full agreement with the psychologist. He epitomizes the two, Wundt's voluntaristic, and the Herbartian intellectualistic psychology, and informs his fellow philologists that they will find that in the main one system works practically as well as the other. He recognizes the decided advantages to which reference has been made above of the more modern psychology, recognizes in fact several points in which it is able to attack problems which the older type of psychology could not undertake. But to a large degree he insists that either theory works as well as the other. Wundt has not been willing to let this attitude of Delbrück go unchallenged, and in a brochure entitled *Sprachgeschichte der Sprachpsychologie* has replied to this and other positions of his critic. He is

¹ *Völkerpsychologie*, Vol. I., pp. 239-40.

particularly sensitive to this assumption of Delbrück's that one brand of psychology is as serviceable as the other. Even if he were willing to waive this point he insists that it is at the bottom not a question of serviceability but of truth, and that with the same measure the philologist measures withal it should be measured to him again. Would he be willing to waive the question of the truth of philological theory and consider only its serviceability for the purposes of some particular presentation? At bottom the question is that which I have tried to make evident, in the contrast between the Wundtian and Herbartian psychologies. The Herbartian psychology cannot, in so far as it is consistent in theory or mechanism, pretend to be anything more than an applied science within the field of philology. Its serviceability from this point of view is bound to be the criterion by which it is judged. The situation is a very different one when the psychologist maintains that language is the field of psychology. He is not called in in this case to render services which are determined by another and judged by another as to their success. He is within his own field, and is his own judge.

The illustration which has just been given is a good one of just this change in the relative positions of the sciences, if Wundt is correct. The question of the beginnings of language is not attacked from the standpoint of the comparative philologist. There is no generalization from the earliest forms of speech with which we are familiar, nor are there any inferences drawn from the *Ursprachen* which can be constructed out of the identities between kindred tongues. The problem is attacked as a psychological problem. Speech is an act and like any other act has its natural history which psychology can undertake to give to us from a study of its nature and its analogy to other acts. It is, in its primitive form, emotional expression, not because primitive languages are more emotional, but because gestures and cries are the external parts of emotional acts. Sympathetic reproduction of seen gestures, and the change in them which answers to the difference of conscious content they arouse are facts with which psychology deals, and out of these facts arises a theory of the origin of language which whether it is correct or not is psychological, and not philological in the ordinary sense of the word.

The philologist has not been successful enough in his efforts to reconstruct a primitive language, to care to contest with the psychologist his right to form theories within his own field. He probably feels that language in its beginnings was a very individual affair. But when it has become an inflected language, a language with a history that is written in external characters and handed down by literatures and grammarians, the assertion that it lies within the field of psychology is a different matter, and here the philologist still considers the psychologist as a serviceable assistant, not as one who may speak by his own right. The question reduces itself very largely to this: How far can the distinction between philology as a historical science and Folkpsychology as a science of principles be carried out? With the determination of the appearance of forms, their specific outward character, and the varied influences from time to time of external influences psychology has nothing to do. But the moment that language is presented as mental process, and one attempts to explain its changes through its use, through the interchange of expression ideal and emotional, through the structure of the sentence, in other words through the outward form of the judgment, the investigation has become a psychological affair, the material with which the philologist deals is psychological material. But even this statement is not unambiguous. As the language exists in the consciousness of the individual it must of course be recognized as psychological material, but the great phenomena of language are not those that appear in the consciousness of individuals. As already indicated they exist for us in the comparison of different languages or dialects, in shifts that lie far beyond the conscious discrimination of those that are subject to them, etc. If these are psychological phenomena they are such in a different sense from that of individual psychology. They must be the phenomena of the Folk-mind. The legitimacy of this conception has already been discussed, the question now is as to serviceability and the effects of its use in the study of language.

The equivocal relation between philosophy and philology is not a new situation. A century ago the place now taken by psychology was usurped by metaphysics. It was the logical

relations and the metaphysical assumptions based upon these logical relations which were felt to underlie the theory of language. The offspring of this marriage between the two disciplines were not promising, and the connection between the sciences has been severed. The substitution of psychology for metaphysics and logic has been a gradual one. The philologists have not consciously elected to have recourse to psychology. They have found themselves within its borders. Their psychology has been frequently, and unfortunately continues still largely to be, of the popular kind—of the kind which assumes that because a change has taken place and brought with it a different use, this use was determined upon by conscious agents, especially when the change seems to have advantages connected with it. Finally, the Herbartians have become through Steinthal and Paul conscious of the dependence of philology upon psychology and have attempted to set out what these relations are. But the work of the great comparative philologists of recent years has been fundamentally psychological, and is becoming increasingly so. The importance of Wundt's work is that he has thought the thing through consistently and has attempted to define and lay out this territory which has become psychological even without the intentions of the investigators themselves.

On the other hand he is called upon to justify his pretensions by his own success in dealing with the problems. I think there can be no question that he has succeeded in locating the question of the origin of language within the field of psychology. As further evidence of this, may be presented the discussion of the relation of the beginnings of language to song and work. Bücher¹ has brought back song to the rhythms of work as its origin. Jespersen maintains that man is a singing animal by nature and connects the primitive outbursts of song with emotional states of love and joy.² The question is at bottom one of the most primitive rhythms in human consciousness, and when Delbrück, who follows Jespersen, while Wundt follows Bücher, says³ that it is not improbable that in the end the ultimate

¹ *Arbeit und Rhythmus*.

² Jespersen, *Progress in Language*.

³ *Grundfragen d. Sprachforschung*, p. 92.

ground for rhythm is to be sought in the varying compass of our consciousness and in the fluctuations of our attention, it is evident that this problem is unquestionably a psychological one.

If we turn now to changes of sounds in words (*Lautwandel*), we find ourselves in the field of acknowledged psychological processes — those of association. It is true that certain scientists have tried to account for these changes through differences of climate and physical environment, acting directly or indirectly on the organs of speech. The complete impossibility of determining any physiological or anatomical differences answering to differences of articulation and pronunciation has led to the abandonment of these explanations and left philologists with causes which in the end must be considered as psychological. This is evident in the substitution for a theory of inheritance of organs and processes, of a theory of 'training' (*Einübungstheorie*), in accordance with which each generation fails adequately to reproduce what it hears and thus introduces unceasing change. This is, however, much too general a theory to answer to the many specific changes that have to be accounted for. Grimm's law for the changes of mutes is an excellent illustration of an orderly procedure in sound-change which remains without any satisfactory explanation. Wundt here has attempted one, based on the assumption that speech has become increasingly more rapid during the periods within which these changes have taken place, and upon investigations of an experimental nature as to the effects of increased tempo in speech. He is of the opinion that the greater rapidity in speaking is an adequate explanation. Unfortunately the philologists not only dispute the adequacy of the hypothesis, but also his facts.¹ But while this hypothesis is presumably untenable, its rejection does not render the problem any the less psychological. If the question is ever answered it will be by the psycho-physical psychologist. Wundt's failure in this case simply emphasizes this.

The treatment of changes by assimilations and dissimilations, whether in letters immediately in contact or at a distance from each other, is confessedly due to the predominance in conscious-

¹ Delbrück, *Grundfragen*, 102 ff.

ness of a sound which merges with another and leads to the changes in question. *E. g.*, the change from *adsimilare* to *assimilare*, *supmus* to *summus*, turtle from *turtur*, purple from *purpur*. In the analogical changes we find influences extending from one word or group of words to another. *E. g.*, the introduction of *t* into the original word egoism after the fashion of despotism, etc., the change of Ger. *sturben* to *starben* after the analogy *starb*. The treatment of all these phenomena belongs to the psychology of fusion, assimilation and association. It is worth while to refer in passing to the advantage to the doctrine of composite words which has accrued through Wundt's carrying the process back to the organization of ideas that lie behind the words.

It would occupy too much space to extend this catalogue through the theory of inflection and the syntax that goes with it. The more complex and specific the expression of relations becomes in the forms of words and their structure in sentences, the more evident becomes the essentially psychological character of the material with which the philologist is dealing.

The most interesting consideration arising out of the two brochures to which I have referred, Delbrück's criticism and Wundt's reply, is to be found in the difference of attitude of the two scientists. We may mention first of all a freedom in dealing with other tongues beside the Indo-European and Semitic groups on the part of the psychologist which is evidently surprising and somewhat displeasing to the philologist. Delbrück withholds himself from criticism, affirming that his own department lies within the Indo-European field. He does, however, suggest that until our knowledge of the languages of other and especially primitive peoples is fuller, especially with reference to their history, deductions drawn from them must be received with scepticism. It is impossible for the reviewer to enter into the question of fact. What is of interest is that Wundt feels himself to have a point of view which justifies him in using material which the philologist who is unquestionably linguistically better prepared than the psychologist is unwilling to use. Wundt shows that he has at least the courage of his convictions. Just as in the question of the origin of language the psychologi-

cal treatment enables the philologist to dispense with a reconstruction based on historical remains and inferences drawn from these, so psychological equipment should enable the philologist to make valuable use of tongues whose history may be out of the reach of science. One of the principal uses which Wundt makes of the extra-Indo-European and Semitic tongues is in the discussion of the development of the sentence. We find among these the attributive sentence, which to his mind comes before the predicative sentence. He connects this naturally with the phenomena of parataxis in the classical groups and the evidence that a paratactical construction has preceded the hypotactical. The psychological interest in the question gathers around the development of the logically organized sentence out of one that is based upon simple processes of association. It should be added that Wundt uses logical here in the psychological sense, that it answers to apperceptive or to the consciousness of relations which comes with the constructive, *i. e.*, apperceptive process. It is a psychological interpretation of the history of the copula and the form of sentence that depends upon it. Without discussing then Wundt's technical competence in this particular philological field, there can be no doubt that psychological competence on the part of a philologist would put at his disposal material which lack of historical data leaves largely barren at present. We have already referred to the psycho-physical hypothesis suggested by Wundt as an explanation for Grimm's law, and have pointed out that its present presumable insufficiency does not detract from its interest as an indication of the essentially psychological nature of this philological question.

Connected with the question of the origin of language is the theory of roots. Older doctrine in philology maintained that there were three periods in the history of language; a period of roots, of agglutinated roots, and a resulting period of inflection, which was not only the last but the most perfect. Of course a language of roots cannot be found, but it was assumed that in the Chinese we had a language which is made up simply of roots stuck together. If we could get so near to the original root period it was but a short leap to that primitive

situation. Later investigation of the Chinese has shown that it is in all probability a development out of an inflected language, that it answers in the theory of language development more nearly to the English in its wearing away of inflections, or rather that the same process of attrition and consequent reconstruction which distinguishes the English, not only from the classical tongues but also from the German, has been carried much farther in the Chinese (v. Jespersen, *Progress in Language*). Furthermore, comparative study of the roots themselves in highly inflected tongues has shown that they are not the original elements, at least in a large number of cases, that the term root must be taken as the element which is left behind when the inflected endings are abstracted and on the logical side as that part of the word of the Indo-European original speech which those who spoke it felt as the center of meaning (*Bedeutungscentrum*).¹ This assumption of what may be called a functional root is still in favor with the philologists. Delbrück still assumes that roots are original elements which can even be conceived of as existing in their naked form in a primitive language. That is, he wishes to regard it not simply as a functional and hence psychological entity, but also as a historical entity. Delbrück attempts such a historical reconstruction, following Jespersen's conception of the primitive speech as a continuum of sound, in which the unit was as yet an undifferentiated sentence, not a word. He sees no reason why the differentiation of the parts of this continuum may not have been roots rather than inflected words. To this Wundt opposes the facts of daily life, the unquestioned appearance of new words which have no preceding history as roots. He opposes furthermore the psychological fact that "the elements of words are in the nature of the case only elements of given word-ideas (*Wortvorstellungen*); the question how the word has arisen remains untouched by them."²

Wundt's definition of the sentence is as follows: "A sentence is the spoken expression for the voluntary organization (*Gliederung*) of an entire idea (*Gesamtvorstellung*) by its parts placed

¹ *Grundfragen*, p. 120.

² *Völkerpsy.*, Vol. I., p. 559.

in their logical relations.”¹ It should be noted that Wundt uses the word logical in its psychological sense, *i. e.*, in the sense of the actual relations subjectively felt in the expression; and that he recognizes two sets of psychical forces at work in the formation of the sentence, the primary associations which in some sense provide the material, and the apperceptive process which is responsible for the organization of the entire idea. These two sets working over against each other are responsible for the determination of the different parts of the sentence, for the original appearance of the words as parts of the sentence, and for the selection of words in developed language. Delbrück is pleased with this conception of the sentence in general, but opposes to it the instances of the vocative and the interjections. These, not to consider the imperative, present expressions in language which are not articulated and which yet must be conceived of from the point of view of expressions (*Äusserungen*) and are not therefore to be genetically distinguished from sentences. The reply is simple enough, that the bare emotional outcry — or the interjection — is not a sentence nor an expression which can be classed as a sentence; that on the other hand where the vocative or the so-called interjection carries a meaning with it there is always an articulation of ideas though there be but a single word outwardly expressed. I have instanced this because it shows that even in the less crucial questions the psychological attitude gives a freedom which the philologist profits by, or may profit by.

Delbrück in closing his criticism undertakes to commend Wundt's psychology to his fellow philologists, by assuring them that it offers a mechanism which is not essentially different from that of the Herbartians, at least in respect to background of the unconscious and the structure of the ideas; Wundt's substitution of the psychical disposition for the interrelated masses of ideas which are pushing themselves above the threshold of consciousness in the Herbartian psychology, for practical purposes, seems to be but the calling of the same thing by another name. Whether the idea lies in the background of consciousness or is below the threshold makes no essential difference in the application.

¹ *Ibid.*, V. II., p. 240.

This does not of course hold for the Wundtian conception of association. This confines association to the connection of ideas as a whole and excludes the processes of assimilation, complication, and fusion. Just these latter processes are those that are most in evidence in the formation of words and their changes, and the proper conception of them tends to correct the tendency to give an unwarranted influence to conscious intention in word changes. But the schemata of apprehension — the anticipation of the sentence-form that is given by a single word, the recognition of a relation and what it involves in the mood of a verb or the case of a noun — these phenomena of perception can perhaps be as readily managed from the one point of view as the other. Perhaps this fact is an indication that the psychological treatment of this structural side of consciousness has not reached a final form. The sharp distinction that Wundt, and not he alone among psychologists, is forced to make between this presented structural material and the apprehensive or attentive processes is by no means an ultimate presentation. In a word, we have here two methods of presentation, a structural treatment, that of the associative and allied processes, which is most readily stated in terms of the nervous system; and a functional statement, that of attention and apperception, which is not dependent upon the nervous system for its presentation. The two treatments are not of a piece, and it is but fair to assume that further development of psychology in the direction of a more consistent presentation, will be of peculiar value within this field of Folkpsychology.